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ABSTRACT
Purpose: To consider the extent to which the legal recognition of  
non-binary gender has the potential to disrupt the gender binary.
Methodology/Approach: This chapter will employ case study as method, 
focusing on recent changes to Australian law and policy, which introduce 
a third gender category. I rely on the work of queer theorists on normativ-
ity and recognition as a theoretical framework and on the work of social 
scientists on transgender people as evidence.
Findings: This chapter finds that while there is much to be celebrated about 
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simultaneously masking the ways in which institutions of regulatory power 
continue to demand conformity with normative standards of gender.
Research Limitations: Since few non-binary individuals in Australia have 
adopted the X marker the implications laid out in this paper are speculative. 
The experiences of non-binary individuals present an important avenue for 
further research.
Practical Implications: I recommend, as an alternative to further gender 
classifications, that we should seek to minimize the degree to which mem-
bership of a particular gender category is used to distribute rights and 
privileges.
Originality/Value of Paper: This chapter advances the literature on non-
binary gender, contributes to existing queer and feminist analyses of the 
gender binary and extends work on normativity to legal recognition of 
alternative genders.
Keywords: Non-binary gender; transgender; gender binary; 
normativity; queer theory; recognition
In April 2014, the highest appeal court in Australia handed down a historic 
decision in which it unanimously found that the New South Wales Registrar 
of Births, Deaths, and Marriages has the power to register a person’s sex as 
“non-specific” (New South Wales Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v 
Norrie, 2014). The decision comes at a time when non-binary people are being 
increasingly recognized in Australian law and policy. In certain circumstances, 
individuals are now permitted to record their sex/gender as something other 
than male or female in passports (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(Cth), n.d.), in birth certificates issued by the Australia Capital Territory 
(Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 24) and New 
South Wales (NSW Registrar v Norrie, 2014), and in personal records held by 
Australian Government departments and agencies (Australian Government, 
2013b). In this chapter, I argue that while there is much to be celebrated about 
increasing alternatives to dichotomous gender categories, the legal recogni-
tion of non-binary gender may in fact be interpreted as bolstering the very 
dichotomous system of gender it purports to undermine.
In the following sections, I explore the implications of formal legal 
recognition of non-binary gender in Australian law and policy. Initially, 
I provide some background to the discussion by tracing the history of the 
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Non-Binary Gender Markers in Australian Law and Policy 229
gender binary in Australian law and the recent activist and policy responses, 
which have sought to have non-binary gender recognized in law. I then out-
line the theoretical context for the subsequent discussion, being the work of 
Michael Warner (2000) on normativity and Dean Spade (2011) on legal rec-
ognition. In the subsequent section, I argue that the x category in Australian 
law and policy enacts what I describe as a politics of containment in which 
non-binary people are identified, stabilized, and purged from the dominant 
gender categories. Through an exploration of the ways in which the x legal 
classification is reliant on medical discourses, which pathologize non-binary 
gender, and the operation of classification systems, which produce mutually 
exclusive categories, I argue that the x marker is pathologizing and essentiali-
zing in ways that are harmful for both non-binary people and people with 
intersex conditions. In the next section, I suggest that the introduction of 
the x marker not only does little to practically disrupt the gender binary 
but may in fact exacerbate it by creating an illusion of equality while institu-
tions of regulatory power continue to marginalize many non-binary trans 
people. In this section, I outline some of the institutions of regulatory power 
that demand conformity with standards of binary gender, including iden-
tity documentation, marriage, and sex-segregated facilities. I ultimately rec-
ommend that rather than introducing further gender categories we should 
instead work toward minimizing the degree to which membership of a partic-
ular gender category is used to distribute rights and privileges. To the extent 
that knowledge of gender is necessary (e.g., for monitoring affirmative action 
policies), I suggest that self-identification should be the determining factor. 
I conclude by exploring some preliminary possibilities for how this might be 
implemented in law and policy, with suggestions for further research.
THE GENDER BINARY AND NON-BINARY GENDER
The division of people into two rigidly fixed, natural and mutually exclu-
sive genders is a key organizing principle of Western societies (e.g., Butler, 
1990; Fausto-Sterling, 2000a; Lorber, 2005). At birth, children are defini-
tively sorted into one of these categories on the basis of the perception of 
their external genitalia. Within this framework, people assigned male at birth 
are expected to identify as men and be masculine, whereas people assigned 
female at birth as expected to identify as women and be feminine. The law 
functions as a key site at which these gender norms are “actively consolidated 
into institutional practice” (Meadow, 2010, p. 820; see also Greenberg, 1999; 
BK-EMP-AGR_VOL24-170240.indb   229 10/10/17   11:24 AM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
W
ol
lo
ng
on
g 
A
t 2
0:
31
 1
4 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
8 
(P
T
)
230 DYLAN AMY DAVIS
Kolbe, 2009; Sharpe, 2002; Spade, 2008). In a 1968 decision of the Civil Court 
of the City of New York, for example, Judge Pecora stated
It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s 
land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’. Yet the standard 
is much too fixed for such far-out theories. (Re Anonymous, 1968, p. 838)
Similarly, in the Australian case of R v Harris (1988), the Court considered 
the submission that even if  it were to decide that a trans individual had not 
undergone surgery to a sufficient extent to be considered a woman at law, it 
was nonetheless “open for the Court to say that there is a third state” that 
she could fall into (1988, p. 170). Justice Matthews ultimately rejected the sub-
mission, stating, “I can see no place in the law for a ‘third sex’,” noting that 
such a category would “cause insuperable difficulties in the application of 
existing legal principles” and “relegate transsexuals to a legal ‘no man’s land’” 
(1988, p. 194).
This case law, however, fails to account for the diversity of bodies and 
identities outside of the male/female binary. Some transgender1 people do not 
identify solely as one binary gender or the other. Individuals who fall under 
the genderqueer or non-binary umbrella, for example, may “have a gender 
which is neither male nor female and may identify as both male and female at 
one time, as different genders at different times, as no gender at all, or dispute 
the very idea of only two genders” (Richards et al., 2016; see also, Bolton & 
Kean, 2015; Nestle, Wilchins, & Howell, 2002). For example, in a 2015 US 
survey of trans people, more than one-third (35%) of respondents indicated 
that their gender identity was best described as non-binary or genderqueer 
(James et al., 2016).
In addition to affecting non-binary trans people, who are the focus of 
this chapter, the dichotomous sex/gender system has implications for peo-
ple with intersex conditions. Intersex is a term which, although contested, 
is generally used to describe “the state of  being born with a combina-
tion of  characteristics (e.g., genital, gonadal, and/or chromosomal) that 
are typically presumed to be exclusively male or female” (G. Davis, 2015, 
p. 2). Intersex activists and academics, however, have long expressed con-
cerns about trans and non-binary activists conflating issues of  identity and 
biology and appropriating the language of  intersex for their own purposes 
(Dreger & Herndon, 2009). This chapter therefore endeavors to keep non-
binary gender identity and intersex status analytically distinct, except to 
the extent that sex and gender are already conflated in Australia law and 
policy. Birth certificates and passports, for example, use the language of  sex, 
despite the fact that in circumstances of  changing a classification it would 
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Non-Binary Gender Markers in Australian Law and Policy 231
be more appropriate to use the language of  gender. Where sex and gender 
have been conflated with implications for intersex people in this chapter, it 
will be noted throughout.
Recent Developments in Australian Law and Policy
In response to the prevailing dichotomous gender structure of the Australian 
legal system some have advocated for the recognition of non-binary gender 
in law, with increasing success. In 2010, for example, self-identified eunuch 
Norrie commenced proceedings against the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths 
and Marriages, who had denied Norrie a recognized details certificate2 with 
sex [sic] listed as “not specified.” On appeal, the High Court unanimously 
found that that the Act recognizes that “a person’s sex may be indeterminate” 
(2014, para. 46) and that the Registrar has the power to record an individual’s 
sex as non-specific (NSW Registrar v Norrie, 2014). Norrie’s case thus rep-
resents a historic decision which forms part of a domestic and international 
trend3 toward broader legal recognition of the third sex/gender categories. For 
example, just a month before the final decision of the High Court in NSW 
Registrar v Norrie (2014) was handed down, the Australian Capital Territory 
also introduced an x classification for birth certificates (Births, Deaths and 
Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 24).
At the level of  policy, the recommendations of  the Australian Human 
Rights Commission’s Sex Files Report (2009) have prompted more inclusive 
passport and record-keeping policies. In 2011, the Department of  Foreign 
Affairs and Trade announced a number of  changes to its passport poli-
cies, including allowing a person to obtain a passport with sex [sic] listed 
as x (Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), n.d.). Likewise, in 
July 2013, the Australian Government released the Australian Government 
Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender which outlines the sex/gen-
der classification policies that apply to federal government departments and 
agencies (Australian Government, 2013b). The Guidelines state that “[w]here 
sex and/or gender information is collected and recorded in a personal record, 
individuals should be given the option to select M (male), F (female) or 
x (indeterminate/unspecified/intersex)” (Australian Government, 2013b, 
para. 19).
Although the legal recognition of non-binary gender has never been the 
subject of widespread campaigning in Australia, the relatively quiet introduc-
tion of the x marker has been celebrated by many as a disruption to the dom-
inant view of gender as binary and a significant win for non-binary rights and 
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232 DYLAN AMY DAVIS
recognition (e.g., Germon, 2014; Pitts, 2014). On top of a growing literature 
of scholarly critique of the gender binary (e.g., Butler, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 
2000a; Lorber, 2005) some scholars have also specifically argued that the 
third gender category “challenges the rigidity of the gender binary system” 
(Monro, 2005, p. 15). For example, in a slightly different context, being the 
third category of restroom, Terry Kogan argues: “The very existence of a 
restroom labeled ‘Other’ forces all persons, especially those who choose to use 
the restrooms labelled ‘Men’ or ‘Women,’ to question their default assump-
tions about sex and gender” (1997, p. 1253).
While Kogan and others like him make important and persuasive argu-
ments for the disruptive potential of the third gender categories, in this chap-
ter I argue for caution. In particular, I suggest that the third category may 
instead be interpreted as bolstering the very dichotomous system of gen-
der it purports to undermine. Before doing so, however, I turn to the work 
of Michael Warner (2000) on normativity and Dean Spade (2011) on legal 
recognition.
NORMATIVITY AND RECOGNITION
Michael Warner (2000) attributes normativity to the invention and spread 
of statistics in the nineteenth century. Within this usage, the term “normal” 
means simply within the common statistical range. However, modern medi-
cine developed around the notion that statistical methods could be used to 
discover natural laws such that “normal came to mean right, proper, healthy” 
(e.g., the average body temperature of the population is the healthy body tem-
perature) (Warner, 2000, p. 57). Thus the statistical norm is often confused 
for the evaluative norm, being a “standard criterion of value” (Warner, 2000, 
p. 56). This understanding of normativity is reminiscent of Foucault’s (1978) 
familiar notions disciplinary power and biopower, which he likewise theo-
rizes as emerging during the nineteenth century. During this time, the state’s 
sovereign power to put someone to death became “supplanted by the admin-
istration of bodies and the calculated management of life” as exemplified by 
the newfound observation of birthrates and public health (Foucault, 1978, 
p. 140). Key to this new mode of power was the invention of certain catego-
ries of improper and unhealthy people (e.g., the homosexual, the criminal, 
the hysterical woman) who in turn become the basis against which norms of 
(im)proper behavior were enforced, evaluated, and monitored. Thus, for both 
Warner and Foucault normal came to be the standard against which one dis-
ciplines or evaluates oneself.
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Non-Binary Gender Markers in Australian Law and Policy 233
For stigmatized groups, such as queer people, the appeal to or insistence 
upon normality is a convenient response to the common perception of sexual 
and gender deviance as pathological (Warner, 2000). Warner argues, however, 
that this simply produces a “hierarchy of shame” within queer politics, which 
positions the “happily coupled veterinarians in a suburban tract home” as 
the “more respectable, easier to defend” constituency of the movement (2000, 
p. 49). Warner attributes this hierarchy of shame to “the structuring conditions 
of gay and lesbian politics,” being the tension between the internal standard 
of the stigmatized queer constituency on the one side, and the external stand-
ard of the dominant culture on the other side (2000, p. 49). He points out that 
queers, like other stigmatized groups, have been tempted to believe that “the 
way to overcome stigma was to win acceptance by the dominant culture,” and 
it is therefore unsurprising that those who are most concerned with achiev-
ing respect and recognition might wish that “their peers in shame would be 
a little less queer, a little more decent” (Warner, 2000, p. 50). The dilemma 
of the appeal to normal is that it “merely throws shame on those who stand 
farther down the ladder of respectability,” since it seems impossible to think 
of oneself  as normal without thinking of another as pathological (Warner, 
2000, p. 60). Importantly, these hierarchies often reinforce other “hierarchies 
of respectability” based on gender variance, race, class, and urban geography 
(Warner, 2000, p. 67).
Trans scholar Dean Spade likewise argues that “legal declarations 
of  ‘equality’ are often tools for maintaining stratifying social and eco-
nomic arrangements” (2011, p. 14). He argues that lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) law reform agendas that “chang[e] what the law 
explicitly says about a group,” such as anti-discrimination in the workplace, 
military inclusion, and same-sex marriage, seek inclusion and recognition 
in dominant institutions without fundamentally challenging the systemic 
inequalities these institutions are based on (Spade, 2011, p. 124). Instead, 
like Warner, Spade (2011) argues that demands for legal recognition and 
inclusion result in certain sub-sections of  the group being targeted as unde-
serving and pursuing the needs of  the favored group who are, in turn, taken 
to represent the whole. He furthermore points to the ways in which admin-
istrative legal systems, such as health care, housing, and education, “create 
structured insecurity and (mal)distribute life chances across populations” by 
using purportedly neutral criteria to distribute resources and opportunities 
in ways which reproduce racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, xenophobic, and 
transphobic outcomes (Spade, 2011, p. 29). By subscribing to a neoliberal 
agenda of recognition and inclusion then, the LGBT law reform work not 
only alienates those most affected by structured inequality but also in fact 
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234 DYLAN AMY DAVIS
further “endangers and marginalizes” (Spade, 2011, p. 15) them by perpetu-
ating the harmful logics of  these systems and “contributing to their illusion 
of fairness and equality” (Spade, 2011, p. 124).
Bearing in mind Warner and Spade’s astute analysis of the trouble with 
appealing to normal in the pursuit of legal recognition, it is necessary to ask 
whether certain hierarchies of shame and structured inequality are also being 
reproduced in the context of the legal recognition of non-binary gender. 
In what ways, for example, is non-binary gender made more respectable, 
more palatable to the dominant culture in the process of recognition? Does 
the legal recognition of non-binary gender affect the administrative distribu-
tion of resources? Are there versions of non-binary gender and gender non-
conformity that are further marginalized in the process of recognition and, 
if  so, does this correspond to other intersecting hierarchies of respectability 
along the lines of race, class, disability, and national origin? I consider these 
issues in the following sections of this chapter.
CONTAINING THE THREAT
In this section, I argue that the x category in Australian law and policy enacts 
a politics of containment in which non-conforming elements are identified, 
essentialized, and purged from the dominant gender categories. As Towle and 
Morgan contend, the third gender category “functions to protect ‘first’ and 
‘second’ categories from becoming analytically muddled or contaminated” by 
implying that the dominant gender categories are “inviolable and unproblem-
atic” (2002, pp. 484–485). In this section, I trace the ways in which the legal 
classification of non-binary gender represented in the x marker is reliant on 
medical discourses that pathologize non-binary gender. I observe that the 
gendered possibilities outside the binary have become explicitly recognized 
by the medical establishment at the same time as the legal classification of x 
has emerged to contain the gendered excess represented therein. Non-binary 
people are thus brought into the dominant gender order and simultaneously 
pathologized as other within it. Given that classification systems rely on the 
assumption that categories are both internally coherent and mutually exclu-
sive from one another, the x category functions not only to differentiate non-
binary gender from the dominant gender categories but also to obscure the 
substantial differences within the x category. As elaborated below, x as a 
legal category thus serves to essentialize non-binary gender in ways that are 
not only contrary to experiences of many non-binary people but also in ways 
that are harmful for people with intersex conditions.
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Non-Binary Gender Markers in Australian Law and Policy 235
Pathologization
As outlined previously, the only two Australian states or territories that 
allow a person to change the sex [sic] on their birth certificate (or similar) to 
something other than male or female are the Australian Capital Territory 
and New South Wales. In each of these circumstances, psychological and/or 
medical evidence in the form of a letter or statutory declaration from a medi-
cal practitioner or psychologist is required to allow the amendment.4 As such 
psychological and medical professionals are installed as gatekeepers to non-
binary gender recognition, consistent with a long history of psycho-medical 
intervention into trans lives (Feinberg, 1996; Stone, 2006).
While historically the treatment of transgender people has not accom-
modated for identifications outside of the binary gender categories, recent 
changes to diagnostic criteria used in the treatment of trans people have 
begun to acknowledge the existence of non-binary people. In May 2013, 
the diagnosis Gender Dysphoria replaced the former diagnosis of Gender 
Identity Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 451–459). Among 
other changes, the entry for Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-5 now observes 
that “[e]xperienced gender may include alternative gender identities beyond 
binary stereotypes” and acknowledges options beyond only the “other gen-
der” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 453). As such, although 
people with gender expressions and identities outside the binary have a long 
history of being pathologized and marginalized by medical systems, this rep-
resents perhaps the first time that they have been explicitly marked out and 
named in the pathologizing processes represented by the DSM.
Other trans scholars have convincingly argued that earlier versions of 
these diagnostic criteria have been instrumental in containing and patholo-
gizing gender non-conforming people who generate friction against domi-
nant gender categories. Spade (2006), for example, argues that normatively 
gendered subjects are created through the process of distinguishing them 
from non-normatively gendered subjects who are in turn produced through 
relevant diagnostic criteria. Using Foucault’s notion that a category of devia-
tion produces a “mill of speech” for identifying “ill” behavior (1978, p. 21), 
Spade (2006) argues that trans-related diagnostic criteria provide a regulatory 
structure that ensures compliance with normative gender through surveil-
lance. The medical model also provides apparent treatment for violations of 
gender norms by allowing trans people with appropriately normative cross-
gender expressions to access hormones and surgeries so that they can pass as 
non-transgender people without disrupting the binary. As such, the creation 
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236 DYLAN AMY DAVIS
of the diagnosis supports the notion that there are two distinct gender group-
ings, which usually contain everyone but are occasionally wrongly assigned 
and therefore need to be rectified in order to re-establish the norm. This serves 
to “privatize” and “de-politicize” (Spade, 2006, p. 317) gender such that the 
focus is on deviant gender performances and never on the compulsory nature 
of the gender binary, which is itself  left intact.
For the most part, the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in the 
DSM-5 continues this tradition of pathologizing transgender people and 
facilitating medical interventions that bring trans people into the dichoto-
mous gender order. This is evident in the fact that alternatives to the “other 
gender” are relegated to parentheses and a passing note only. Nonetheless the 
DSM-5 presents an interesting development in that it creates some space for 
non-normatively gendered subjects to exist outside of their assigned binary 
gender without having to be brought into the opposite gender. I suggest in the 
next section, however, that the third legal gender category functions to contain 
the threat that this presents for the dominant gendered order. Thus, although 
the non-normatively gendered possibilities represented by the DSM-5 have 
the potential to blur the boundary between male and female, the introduction 
of the third legal gender ensures that non-binary gender is defined, delimited, 
and contained into its own category, ensuring that the existing categories of 
male and female remain uncontaminated. It is to the categorizing impulse of 
law, and the implications of this, that I now turn.
Legal Classification
The law, with its tendencies toward identification, classification, and regula-
tion, is well-equipped to perform the kind of containment necessary to purify 
the male/female binary of undesirable elements. The law’s impulse toward 
categorization arises as a result of its need to “simplify complex concepts” 
(Grenfell & Hewitt, 2012, p. 761) in order to apply standardized legal reason-
ing. The work of Bowker and Star (1999) on the political and ethical dimen-
sions of classification systems is useful for understanding the implications of 
this process. They remind us that while classification methods purport only 
to group pre-existing types of things in a manner that is neutral and natural, 
the process in fact does the ideological work of shaping the world (Bowker 
& Star, 1999). While classification systems are universal cognitive coping 
mechanisms, it is nevertheless a mistake to assume that they sort things 
along obvious or natural lines (Bowker & Star, 1999). Through an explora-
tion of, for example, race classifications in apartheid South Africa and health 
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classifications made by medical professionals, Bowker and Star (1999) reveal 
the ways in which classification systems privilege some distinctions as natural 
and significant while others are entirely ignored, with implications for the 
populations who are produced and regulated in the process.
Importantly, these classification systems also rely on assumptions of simi-
larity and difference. Meadow reminds us, in a discussion of (binary) clas-
sifications of transgender people by US courts, that to function properly 
classification systems must “denote mutually exclusive groups” (2010, p. 817). 
For Meadow, the effect of this requirement is that “[o]bjects that cut across 
categories must be placed in one box or another” (2010, p. 817). I suggest, 
furthermore, that an alternative (and additional) way of coping with objects 
that cut across categories is to create the third category such that all three 
categories are mutually exclusive from each other.
However, this framework for understanding non-binary gender as funda-
mentally and obviously different from each of the binary genders is inconsist-
ent with the lived realities of many gender diverse people. One sociological 
study of transgender people, for example, found that 92% of respondents 
typically presented themselves as a man or as a woman in public and hoped 
to appear as such, despite the fact that only 67% of respondents identi-
fied themselves in binary terms (as either a man, woman, male, or female) 
(E. C. Davis, 2009). Given the limitations on publicly available gender catego-
ries, trans people are engaged in creating coherence for both themselves and 
others in situations where it may not be possible to convey the complexities of 
the gendered self  or where it may be dangerous to do so (E. C. Davis, 2009). 
As such, the x marker functions to erase much that is disruptive about gender 
non-conformity, being its multiplicity and incoherence, by imposing norms 
of essentialism and stability.
The homogenizing effects of the x marker are not only evident in the 
extent to which the category obscures differences among non-binary people 
but also in the extent to which it problematically conflates non-binary gender 
and intersex status, instead subsuming them within one undifferentiated cat-
egory. The draft version of the Australian Government Guidelines (Australian 
Government, 2013a) allowed people to adopt an x marker in circumstances 
where they had an intersex condition but not where they were trans. After 
submissions by non-binary trans people, the category was widened such that 
the x category in the final form of the Guidelines was described to mean 
“indeterminate/intersex/unspecified.” An uninformed reader would likely 
assume that the terms “indeterminate,” “intersex,” and “unspecified” are syn-
onymous. As such, it is arguable that non-binary trans people have simply 
been subsumed within a pre-existing intersex category, erasing the substantial 
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differences between them. As discussed previously, intersex is congenital and 
relates to sex in the sense of genetic, chromosomal, and hormonal factors 
(G. Davis, 2015), whereas transgender refers to a conflict between gender 
identity and gender assigned at birth (Burdge, 2007). Locating people with 
intersex and non-binary trans people within one category, therefore, misses 
that the vast majority of people with intersex identify as either male or female 
(National LGBTI Health Alliance, 2013), and that “that intersex experiences 
and advocacy may become muddied, co-opted, or misguided in the conflation 
of transgender and intersex” (Dreger & Herndon, 2009, p. 213). By subsum-
ing non-binary and intersex people into one undifferentiated category the 
x marker thus not only functions to contain the apparent threat posed by 
non-binary trans people and people with intersex to the stability and coher-
ence of the gender binary, but in doing so dismisses as irrelevant the range of 
actual experiences within this apparently homogenous group.
In this part, I have argued for the normalizing effects of appealing to the 
dominant culture for respect and recognition. In particular, I have argued 
through the interdependent processes of pathologization and classification 
much of what is troublesome about gender non-conformity becomes erased 
or otherwise eliminated as gendered experiences outside the binary are iden-
tified, stabilized, and essentialized. That which is conceptually salvageable 
within the dominant gendered order becomes classified and normalized, while 
that which is unable to be assimilated remains incomprehensible. Warner’s 
“hierarchies of respectability” (2000, p. 67) are thus reinscribed, privileg-
ing those non-binary people who can more readily approximate normalcy. 
At the same time, the privileged status of the dichotomous gender categories 
remains intact as, insofar as non-binary gender is brought into the domi-
nant gender order, it continues to be pathologized and distinguished from 
the binary gender categories. Non-normative genders are thus purged from 
the dominant categories and any threat they pose to the dichotomous gender 
order is conceptually contained.
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE GENDER  
BINARY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In this part, I suggest that while one legal discourse may formally recog-
nize non-binary gender, the administrative legal discourses which determine 
access to services and resources make little to no space for non-binary gen-
der. In these circumstances, people who elect to have an x identifier on 
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their documents would likely be marked for further scrutiny, gender polic-
ing, and harassment. I suggest then that the introduction of  the x marker 
not only does little to practically disrupt the gender binary but may in fact 
exacerbate it by creating an illusion of  equality while institutions of  regula-
tory power continue to leave them bereft in a system with a limited form of 
citizenship. In this section, I outline some of  the institutions of  regulatory 
power that demand conformity with standards of  binary gender, including 
identity documentation, marriage, and sex-segregated facilities. I conclude 
this section by suggesting that, while legal recognition may be an option 
for those non-binary people who are otherwise already served by regula-
tory systems and prevailing socio-economic arrangements, it would likely 
compound the harms perpetuated against those who are the most margin-
alized at the intersection of  race, class, disability status, employment, and 
immigration status.
Identity Documents
Proof of identity is required for a multitude of everyday transactions. 
Whereas for most people providing identity documents will be a fairly rou-
tine matter, for those people with a lack of consistent identity documents it 
can have wide-ranging impacts on their participation in the social, economic, 
and political aspects of civic life. In most of the literature relating to trans 
identity documents to date, scholars and commentators have drawn attention 
to the lack of consistency in policies for changing gender records from male 
to female, or vice-versa (e.g., Meadow, 2010; Spade, 2008). In Australia, for 
example, passports, health-care cards, and social security are managed at a 
federal/national level, while birth certificates and driver’s licenses are man-
aged at a state and territory level. On top of this, non-government and pri-
vate organizations, such as banks and universities, tend to develop their own 
conflicting policies for allowing people to change their gender marker.
In these circumstances, trans scholars and activists have advocated for low-
ering the thresholds for allowing gender reclassification, including abolishing 
stringent and unnecessary surgeries requirements. With the introduction of 
the x marker by only some administrative institutions in Australia, however, 
non-binary people who want to be recognized as such face the impossibility 
of carrying consistent identity documents with which to prove their identity. 
Although federal passport policy and the Australia Government Guidelines 
now allow for the x identifier, only two of the eight states and territories 
allow sex [sic] to be recorded as something other than male or female on 
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birth certificates (or equivalent), and even then, only in limited circumstances. 
While the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages has the power to 
record the sex [sic] of a person as “non-specific” following the decision in 
NSW Registrar v Norrie (2014), it can only do so where the individual has 
undergone a “surgical procedure” involving the “alteration of reproduc-
tive organs” (Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), 
s 32A(b)). Given the fact that surgery involving the reproductive organs is 
dangerous, expensive, and considered unnecessary for many trans and non-
binary people, having a “non-specific” sex designation on a birth certificate 
remains a slim possibility for the overwhelming majority of non-binary trans 
people in NSW.
Spade has remarked on the “the economic and political impairment” that 
arises in the US context from being “inconsistently classified in the [gender] 
rule matrix” (2008, p. 747). For many trans people, being unable to provide 
basic identification documents that consistently show their current name and 
gender means that they are outed in the process of applying for jobs, hous-
ing, and finance, as well as a myriad of other common transactions. Similarly 
in the 2007 Australian TranzNation survey, 32.4% of participants reported 
that they had received lesser treatment due to issues regarding name/gender 
on documents and 31.6% reported that they had been refused employment 
or denied a promotion in an existing job (Couch et al., 2007). On top of 
that, 15% had been refused bank finance, 12% had been refused housing, and 
26.9% had been refused services in other areas (Couch et al., 2007).
Sex-Segregation
The fact that non-binary genders are generally not recognized is exempli-
fied by the abundance of  sex-segregated institutions in Australian society. 
Although trans people who fall within the gender binary are increasingly 
gaining access to appropriate sex-segregated facilities, non-binary people 
not only fail to gain access to services that affirm their gender but also may 
be left in a legal no man’s land. The most notable of  these institutions in the 
Australian context is marriage, which continues to be defined under Section 
5 of  the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as “the union of  a man and a woman to 
the exclusion of  all others,” despite several attempts in recent years to intro-
duce same-sex marriage.5 Although there is no case law about marriages 
involving non-binary people, there has been one reported Australian case 
where the court has considered the validity of  a marriage involving a person 
with intersex, which found that the marriage was void on the basis that he 
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was “neither man nor woman, but a combination of  both” (In the Marriage 
of C & D, 1979, p. 640). The case was subsequently overturned on the basis 
that, among other things, a person with intersex was entitled to “choose 
their sex and marry” (Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Kevin, 2003, 
para. 231). While the conflation of  trans and intersex are problematic for 
the reasons outlined earlier, given the conflation of  sex and gender within 
the popular imaginary and the legal system in particular, such case law is 
nonetheless illuminative. It remains to be seen whether a person who refuses 
to choose a sex (or gender) would be permitted to enter into or remain in a 
marriage, but given the current wording of  the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) it 
seems unlikely.
Other sex-segregated facilities may also impact on a non-binary person’s 
sense that they are not recognized by the legal system. These include pris-
ons, homeless shelters, drug treatment centers, foster care group homes, 
domestic violence shelters, and public toilets. Given rates of job and housing 
discrimination experienced by trans people, they may have an increased need 
to access sex-segregated services. For example, the 2015 US Trans Survey 
found that respondents reported high rates of experience in the underground 
economy, with 20% having participated in sex work, drug sales, and other 
work that is currently criminalized at some point in their lives (James et al., 
2016). Furthermore, 12% of respondents had experienced homelessness in 
the past year due to being transgender (James et al., 2016).
Unequal Distribution
In the previous part, I have explored various legal and administrative dis-
courses that maintain a binary view of gender in order to demonstrate that 
while one legal discourse may formally recognize non-binary gender, the 
administrative and legal discourses that determine their access to services and 
resources make little to no space for non-binary gender. As a result of this 
tension, it is evident that the introduction of the third gender category serves 
not only to obscure the persistence and prevalence of the gender binary in 
regulatory legal systems but also grants non-binary people a limited form of 
citizenship and impedes upon their ability to access certain social, economic, 
and political opportunities.
This is not to say that no non-binary people will adopt the x marker. I 
suggest, however, that the benefits of  non-binary legal recognition will be 
unequally distributed. As Spade points out, it is trans people who experience 
the most extreme vulnerability at the intersection of  race, class, disability 
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status, employment, and immigration status, who are most likely to have 
“aspects of  their lives are directly controlled by legal and administrative 
systems of  domination… that employ rigid gender binaries” such as prisons 
and homeless shelters (2011, p. 13). As such, the 2015 US Trans Survey 
reported that although 30% of  all respondents had experienced homeless-
ness during their lifetime, the rate of  homelessness was significantly higher 
for transgender women of  color, including American Indian (59%), Black 
(51%), multiracial (51%), and Middle Eastern (49%) women (James et al., 
2016). Similarly, while 2% of  all respondents reported being assaulted or 
attacked when presenting inconsistent identification documents, Middle 
Eastern respondents were almost five times as likely (9%) to report expe-
riencing this, American Indians were three times as likely (6%), and Black 
respondents were twice as likely (4%) (James et al., 2016). Although these 
statistics are specific to race-relations in the United States, there is noth-
ing to suggest that this general trend is not replicated in Australia. I argue, 
therefore, that while most non-binary people who adopt the x marker 
would be impaired by a system which otherwise does not recognize them, 
it is those non-binary people who are otherwise marginalized by systems of 
dominance and control along the lines of  race, class, and disability status 
who would suffer the greatest disadvantages in doing so. Thus, in appealing 
to recognition from the dominant culture Warner’s “hierarchies of  respect-
ability” are further reinscribed (2000, p. 67).
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, I have argued that, given the normalizing effects of appealing 
to the dominant culture for recognition, the third legal gender category may be 
interpreted as bolstering the very dichotomous system of gender it purports 
to undermine. As an alternative to this, I suggest that we should seek to mini-
mize the degree to which membership of a particular gender category is used 
to distribute rights and privileges. In this section, I briefly review a number 
of state interests that apparently justify classifying and discriminating on the 
basis of gender including protection against identity fraud, safety and com-
fort, opposition to same-sex marriage, effective governmental planning (par-
ticularly in relation to public health), and monitoring participation in public 
activity for the purposes of affirmative action. I conclude that, for the most 
part, the benefits to the state do not outweigh the harms perpetuated against 
gender minorities, including non-binary trans people. To this end, following 
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other queer, trans, and feminist scholars, I recommend that we instead move 
toward “deliberate degendering” (Lorber, 2005) or “dis-establish[ing] gender 
from the state” (Currah, 2006, p. 24; see also, Spade, 2008, 2011).
To their credit, the Australia Government Guidelines are already cogni-
zant of the unnecessary collection of gender data. As such, the Guidelines 
state that departments and agencies “must not collect information unless it 
is necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the agency’s functions 
or activities” (Australian Government, 2013b, para. 29). While this is a step 
in the right direction, I predict that the pervasiveness of binary gender and 
its social significance will make it difficult for decision-makers to critically 
assess whether gender categories are truly required and whether the necessity 
of gender categories outweighs their oppressive nature. In any case, I recom-
mend that degendering should take place on a significantly larger scale than 
that implied in by the Australian Government Guidelines, arguing in favor of 
an end of gender designation as a tool of identification, the degendering of 
marriage and moving toward reducing sex-segregated facilities. To the extent 
that knowledge of gender is necessary, I suggest that self-identification should 
be the determining factor.
Identity Fraud
Many commentators have claimed that gender has limited value as a predic-
tor of  appearance for the purposes of  identification (Bennett, 2014; Fausto-
Sterling, 2000b; Spade, 2008). Ezie argues that “given the sheer variety of 
bodies (for example, stocky, lanky, curvy, flat-chested)” that exist within 
the categories of  male and female, gender is a “fatally imprecise” identifier 
(2011, p. 191). Spade (2008), likewise, has charted the significant variation 
in gender reclassification policies across agencies and states in the United 
States in order to demonstrate the instability of  gender as a category of 
identity verification. The fact that in one jurisdiction an individual needs a 
penis (phalloplasty) to be reclassified as male, while in another jurisdiction 
he needs to remove his uterus, ovaries, and breasts but does not need a penis 
attests to the fact that gender is “unstable and unreliable as an indicator 
of  any particular ‘truth’ across the entire system” (Spade, 2008, p. 803). In 
an age where photographs, digital signatures, retinal scans, blood type, and 
other technology exist to identify people more accurately, gender markers 
are no longer necessary or useful for the purposes of  correctly identifying 
individuals.
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Safety
Sex-segregation, and its corollary, binary gender classification, are often justified 
on the basis of the safety and comfort of primarily non-transgender women. 
However, commentators have questioned whether the aims of sex-segregation 
in bathrooms, shelters, group homes, and prisons are best met by sex-segrega-
tion (Spade, 2008). For example, research on a series of experimental gender-
integrated prisons, which were established in the 1970s and 1980s in the United 
States, found that violence within the facilities was significantly reduced, espe-
cially amongst men and including sexual assault (Smykla, 1979). As such, some 
have argued that personal security is a function primarily of supervision, not 
segregation, and that prisoners are more vulnerable in poorly supervised sex-
segregated environments than in well-supervised co-ed facilities (Herbert, 1985). 
Sanders and Stryker (2016) make a similar argument in the context of public 
bathrooms that safety is a function of communal space and increased occupancy 
rather than segregation. This is not to diminish the very real fears of discomfort, 
harassment, and assault experienced by people, often women, in relation to gen-
der-integrated facilities, but rather to question whether there are other policies 
that might produce more meaningful safety measures without also harming 
trans and non-binary people. Further research in this area is required, but it 
may begin with consideration of, for example, locked, single-stall bathrooms or 
increased security in residential facilities (see Sanders & Stryker, 2016).
Same-Sex Marriage
In NSW Registrar v Norrie (2014), the High Court pointed to the state’s continu-
ing investment in binary gender categories for the purpose of marriage, stating 
that “[t]he chief, perhaps the only, case where the sex [sic] of the parties to the 
relationship is legally significant is marriage” (2014, para. 42). Many commenta-
tors have identified the homophobia inherent in transgender jurisprudence, with 
much of the case law on the issue of gender classifications arising in relation to 
the validity of a marriage (Cruz, 2010; Sharpe, 1997, 2002). I suggest, however, 
that homophobia is a poor excuse for maintaining restrictive and harmful gender 
classifications in circumstances where they are otherwise of limited usefulness.
Public Health
Spade (2008) submits that one area, that may benefit from retaining the 
use of gender data would be public health. It is necessary, however, to con-
sider what assumptions are being made about the work that gender does in 
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this context. For a government program interested in tracking uterine cancer 
rates, for example, it may be more useful to gather information about people 
with uteruses rather than people classified as females since not all of these 
people will have uteruses (Spade, 2008). While it makes sense to record infor-
mation about sex and gender as part of an individual’s medical history, there 
is no reason why this should be a primary part of their record or why it should 
act as an obstacle to obtaining certain treatments.
Affirmative Action
It may be necessary for institutions to refrain from degendering in specific 
circumstances, particularly in relation to evaluating efforts to redress dis-
crimination against women and trans people (Lorber, 2005). In these cir-
cumstances, however, data should be collected only to the degree that it 
is necessary to achieve these aims. Although it is beyond the scope of  this 
paper to set out in detail how every area of  law and policy should go about 
degendering, I suggest that where it is necessary to know a person’s gender, 
this should be based on self-identification, and preferably using one’s own 
language. Where this kind of  self-identification is not an option for practical 
reasons (e.g., the collection of  quantitative data), measures should be taken 
to ensure that categories are fluid and non-essentialist (see Westbrook & 
Saperstein, 2015 for recommendations). This may include giving individuals 
a variety of  options, seeking regular feedback in relation to what categories 
should be offered, making answering optional and allowing people to select 
more than one gender. In some circumstances, such as data collection in 
relation to affirmative action policies, it may be more appropriate to allow 
people to opt in or out of  relevant categories, for example, to ask whether 
people identify in whole or in part as women. The issue of  how best to imple-
ment a degendering of  public policy presents an important avenue for fur-
ther research in this area.
CONCLUSION
While recent changes to Australian law and policy have been celebrated by many 
as a win for the non-binary trans people and a disruption to the dichotomous 
gender system, this chapter instead approaches these developments with caution. 
As governments and institutions deploy policies that purport to recognize non-
binary trans people, it is crucial to map not only the ways in which the gender 
system is complicated but also the ways that system is sustained and reinscribed 
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through these policies. In this chapter, I have outlined the ways in which non-
binary trans people continue to be marginalized, pathologized, and excluded 
from civic life in spite of their legal recognition and argue, in fact, that this is a 
necessary effect of appealing to the dominant culture for inclusion. As I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, processes of legal classification and administrative 
governance continue to uphold the privileged status of normative, dichotomous 
gender, relegating non-binary gender instead to the pathologized third category 
with access to a limited form of citizenship. Given the failures of recognition, 
and its normalizing effects, I recommend instead that we do away with gendered 
categories as a mode of distributing rights and privileges altogether. In doing 
so, I advocate not only for a world in which a diversity of gendered experiences 
outside the binary can thrive but also for reducing the degree to which the state 
regulates and controls the lives of all sex and gender minorities.
NOTES
1. ‘Transgender’ and ‘trans’ are umbrella terms applied to people whose sense of 
themselves as gendered people (gender identity) is in some way incongruent with the 
gender assigned to them at birth, where assigned gender is typically based on the 
medical perception of external genitalia (Burdge, 2007).
2. A resident of NSW who was born overseas may apply to the NSW Registrar of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages for registration of their sex [sic]. Upon registration of a 
change of sex the person may apply to the Registrar for issue of a recognized details 
certificate: Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), Pt 5A.
3. Other countries have recently changed their laws to allow recognition of sex/
gender identities other than male or female, including Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan (see, e.g. Bochenek & Knight, 2012).
4. ACT: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 25(1)(a). 
NSW: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), s 32C. Passports: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), n.d. Federal records: Australian 
Government, 2013, para. 24.
5. As of 2016, there have been 18 unsuccessful attempts in the Federal Parliament 
to legalize same-sex marriage (McKeown, 2016). At the time of going to print, the 
Australian Government is preparing to conduct a non-binding, nation-wide survey on 
the issue of same-sex marriage (Sainty, 2017).
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